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| Author: |
Neil W Rickert |
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Re: Universality as warrant for relative truth value |
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Haines Brown <brownh@teufel.hartford-hwp.com> writes:
>Neil W Rickert <rickert+nn@cs.niu.edu> writes:
Lots of snippage. I only quote enough to provide context for my
responses.
>Your paragraph puzzles me. Are in you fact saying that theories lack
>truth value, and that this lack of truth value is not only conventional
>wisdom, but also common sense?
I am saying that the conventional wisdom takes theories to be true.
I don't think we can generalize about common sense, because it
does not seem to be common. That is, what one person derives from
common sense can be different from what another derives. Or, to
say it differently, common sense is common in that it is not rare -
just about everybody exhibits common sense. But it is not common
in the sense of being shared (something held in common by all).
>I should note that my dictionary tells me that English writers often
>confuse the words theory and hypothesis, so that the word theory can
>mean simply a conjecture. I assume we aren't making this mistake.
I am not making that mistake. I was using "theory" in the sense
of "scientific theory".
In any case, let me give an example:
Suppose I develop a theory of automobile driving. Part of that theory
will be the rule that we drive on the right side of the road (except
for one-way roads).
If the British were to develop a theory it would be similar, except that
it would say that we drive on the left side of the road.
If theories have truth value, which of those theories is true - the British
one, or ours?
My view is that theories are pragmatic constructs, and that
saying the theory is true adds nothing (though it might be good
marketing strategy). What matters is that practice be consistent
with the theory.
>My dictionary definition for "theory" uses the example of the general
>principles behind musical practice. So are you suggesting that it is
>obvious on the face of it that the general principles of music lack
>truth value in that music has no general principles?
I certainly think that music has no general principles. But you
will probably misunderstand that. By way of comparison, I also
have been known to say that natural languages have no grammar,
and that there are no laws of nature.
> Doesn't common
>sense suggest that there are general principles in music to which the
>term musical theory refers?
That's an entirely different question, unrelated to whether music
has general principles, though people often take them to be related.
Humans organize their world. In organizing our world of music, we
introduce principles. I am saying that those are human principles
for how we should organize music (or our study of music), and
that those principles are not a natural property of music itself,
independent of our organizing.
Getting back to scientific theories, let's use the example of
special relativity that you mentioned. SR contains or implies
the statement E=mc^2. I am not at all questioning whether that
statement is true, or has a truth value. It is the theory as a
whole that I say is neither true nor false, hence has no truth value.
The theory introduces terminology, and determines the meaning
of the terms introduced. It also sets standards for evaluating
the truth of statements made that use the terminology. Under the
standards of truth set by SR (as a theory), E=mc^2 turns out to be
a true statement.
As I see it, SR (as a theory) is not making statements about the
world. Rather, it is making statements about its own terminology,
about how to use that terminology - roughly speaking, it is making
statements about empirical practices to be followed when using
the theory.
I think my view is not too different from that expressed by
C.I. Lewis, "A Pragmatic Conception of the A Priori" (a 1923 article
in J. of Philosophy, and reprinted in the book "A Priori Knowledge
(ed. Paul K. Moser)).
>The final thing I find strange about your paragraph is the suggestion
>that I should not swallow conventional wisdom. Why not?
You should question it. You might still follow it, even though
you question it. But questioning is good.
> Shouldn't we contest convention only when there are
>contradictions that compel us to do so?
That depends on what you mean by "contest". There could be parts
of the conventional wisdom that you question, but that you find it
not worth the effort to contest. I don't have a problem with that.
It's part of getting along in a community.
>But keep in mind that you, or more likely, Jason brought up the name of
>Richard Rorty as his inspiration.
That was jason. I haven't decided what to make of Rorty.
> Rorty felt that we make a big mistake
>to assume that our mental conceptions have truth value in relation to
>the world to which our conceptions refer. Given this, it is natural for
>me to have taken a statement that truth is a social convention to mean
>that it is nothing but a social convention and has no truth value in
>relation to the world. If I confused your position with that of Jason or
>Rorty, I apologize.
When I suggest that truth is a social convention, I have in mind
that this includes social conventions that (in some sense) connect
propositions to the world. That would include measuring conventions,
meaning conventions, etc. What I disagree with is the view often
seen in theological and philosophical literature, that seems to
treat truth as something that is completely human independent,
that we just have to somehow discover.
>While you seem to imply that the truthfulness of statements is not
>something to be resolved by philosophical understanding, you seem to do
>the opposite in practice. For example, either you or Jason mentioned a
>utilitarian theory of truth, which I take to be the philosophical
>position that the test for truth is utility.
I don't hold to a utilitarian theory of truth. I do hold to a utilitarian
basis for truth. Those are quite different.
Go back to that theory of driving. We adopt rules to drive on the
right side of the road because of its utilitarian value - it reduces
accidents if everyone drives on the same side of the road. Once we
have adopted those rules, the proposition "you were driving on the
wrong side of the road" has a truth value that is not dependent on
the utilitarian value of a particular instance of driving.
>> I believe that correspondence theory could not possibly be a
>> definition of "truth".
>As I showed, it is in fact presumed by the dictionary definition.
Dictionary definitions (so called) don't actually define. I expect
a definition to give some explicit principle that can be applied.
Otherwise it is not a definition. Perhaps my idea of "definition"
is influenced by my being a mathematician.
I have no problem with the broad idea of truth as having something
to do with correspondence. But, from my point of view, that is far
too broad to count as a definition.
In my spare time, I study questions related to human cognition.
One way to think about that, is to think about what would be
required to construct an artificial cognitive agent (or artificial
person) - note that this need not imply Artificial Intelligence
(computationalism). If I wanted to create an artificial agent, then
that agent would need some way to discern truth. It would also need
some way to apprehend reality. I expect definitions to provide some
guidance on such a construction. As I see it, the correspondence
theory does not provide any guidance at all to providing a way for
the agent to discern truth. And I seem to require that an ability
to discern truth is already in place before I can work on ways for
the agent to apprehend reality. That, roughly speaking, is why
I want a theory of truth that does not depend on correspondence,
and then to use a correspondence theory of reality.
-----
>> I don't actually disagree with saying that truth is correspondence
>> with reality. My disagreement is with calling that a theory of truth.
>> I see it as a theory of reality.
>The correspondence theory of truth is conventionally considered a
>"theory" of truth, as is a rationalist theory of truth or a coherence
>theory of truth. See Wikipedia.
>You don't object to the content of the correspondence theory, but to
>characterizing it as a theory, for you say a correspondence theory is
>actually a theory of reality. Sorry, this makes no sense to me at all. A
>theory of reality is usually called an ontology; the word "truth" is a
>property of our _statements_, as the dictionary makes clear, not a
>property of the world.
Sorry, I'm not understanding that.
Berkeley's theory of reality was idealism. According to Berkeley,
reality exists only as ideas in the mind, and there is no physical
existence. I am not understanding why Berkeley's ontology would
be significantly different from the ontology of a realist.
-----
>> Unless you want to take consensus as a basis for truth, I see no
>> reason to conclude that scientific theories are either true or false.
>> What is important about them, is that they define empirical practice
>> in the field. That requires that they be accepted as good practice,
>> but it does not require that they be either true or false.
>Do I understand you to be adopting an instrumentalist position, with an
>agnosticism about whether our theories happen to be true or not?
Not in the sense in which "instrumentalism" was used by empiricist
philosophers.
-----
>> Sigh. Once again, I'll remind you that I have not been skeptical
>> about whether there is truth. It's just that truth does not matter
>> for scientific theories. If you want to take a scientific theory to a
>> monastery, and see if you are given divine guidance on its truth,
>> that's your right. But it will make no difference to the science.
>Sigh ;-). I don't understand what you mean by saying that truth does not
>matter when it comes to scientific theories. It obviously means a lot to
>those who propose them, for they think of themselves in a quest for
>truth.
Many scientists consider themselves pragmatists, rather than truth
seekers.
For sure, scientists want to make truthful statements about the
world. But what does that have to do with the truth of the
scientific theories themselves?
When Newton gave us "F=ma", he was not making a truthful statement
about the world. Rather, he was giving his definition of mass,
a new concept. Having made that definition, he was now able to
express many true propositions that used the concept of mass.
But the purpose of the law itself was to introduce and define the
new concept, not to make a truthful statement about the world.
> I suspect it means something to the man on the street, who not
>only is inclined to assume that money spent on scientific research is
>spend on a quest for truth about the world, but is deeply affected every
>day by the fact that scientific theory has truth value (he drives an
>automobile to work which is a product of the so-called Second Industrial
>Revolution that is characterized in part by the application of science
>to production).
The man on the street doesn't even understand the word "theory"
(as used in "scientific theory"). He may indeed expect that
science produces true propositions about the world. But producing
true propositions about the world does not require that the theory
itself have a truth value.
>> The gas laws from physics are false, and well known to be false. They
>> are usually called "ideal gas laws" in recognition that we have to
>> consider an imaginary ideal gas if we want them to be true. But they
>> are still useful for real non-ideal gases.
>The gas laws are approximate truths, are they not?
Sure. But that does not make them true - it only makes them
approximately true.
> Any why are they
>useful?
They have proved to be useful in scientific practice. There is no
more to it that that. It's a mistake to try to find a philosophical
principle to explain their usefulness.
> Contrary to what you
>have yourself insisted upon, you seem to deny here that gas laws are
>true because they are not an absolute truth.
"Approximate truth" constrasts with "exact truth", and "absolute
truth" contrasts with "relative truth". You are mixing up the
terminology.
The distinction between approximate truth and exact truth is quite
important, and should be particularly important to philosophers.
For philosophers like to use logic arguments everywhere, and ordinary
logic does not work with approximate truth.
>Who (besides yourself) says the gas laws are false?
I think most physicists would agree with me on that.
-------
>> You are the one who wrote of transmission of knowledge. We cannot
>> transmit the act or state of knowing. We cannot transmit clear
>> perceptions. We cannot transmit cognition. It seems that your
>> definition fits my use of "knowledge" better than it fits yours.
>Of course, when we speak of the transmission of knowledge, we imply the
>transfer of statements that have truth value.
But why call it "transmission of knowledge", when it is information, not
knowledge, that is being transmitted?
> If I
>make a statement that everyone, including myself, know to be false, but
>actually turns out by some fluke to correspond with reality, wouldn't
>that be a true statement which is a property intrinsic to statements and
>independent of our beliefs about those statements.
That's a tricky question. Making a statement is an intentional
action. If your intention was to make a false statement, but what
you said was actually true, perhaps that would make your statement
doubly false in the sense that it didn't even match your intentions
in making that statement.
I think we can get by without having to settle such tricky questions.
>> No, you are not characterizing truthful statements. For that you
>> would have to first have characterised what it means for a statement
>> to be in correspondence with the world, and you would have needed to
>> present that characterisation in a way that did not depend on the
>> notions of truth and truthfulness.
>No, I don't think so. In the correspondence theory of truth, there are
>many kinds of correspondence, but difficulty defining just which is
>meant does not deconstruct the definition of a correspondence theory of
>truth.
A definition ought to be definitive. Otherwise the term "definition"
is not appropriate.
>> I'll assume you are familiar with Gettier, and the problem he found
>> with "justified".
>Sorry, I was not familiar with Gettier, probably mainly because I've
>never taken neo-Kantianism very seriously. The grounds of my belief are
>action in the world and history, not semantics and philosophy.
Okay. Gettier came out with some examples where beliefs could be
true and justified, yet obviously should not count as knowledge.
His 1963 paper title: "Is justified true belief knowledge?" Maybe
take a peek at "http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gettier_case".
--------
>Not at all clear here. So let me recall the context. I had originally
>asked for justifications for the coherence theory suggestion that the
>potential truth value of a theory is a function of its
>universality.
Yes, sorry. I don't really have much to say about coherence theories,
other than that I am skeptical of them.
>> Proofs exist in mathematics, but not in real life.
>That's right. Proofs in a narrow sense of being absolute, unequivocal or
>rigid, exist only in logic and mathematics, which might suggest that
>they are faulty in some respect. But we use the word "proof" in a looser
>sense as warrant, justification, etc.
That doesn't work for me. I see "warrant" and "justification"
as very tenuous ideas.
The broader sense of "proof" is that of a persuasive argument.
But whether a person is persuaded will vary from person to person.
You can say what you want about justification, but unless it
persuades me, I won't count it. When a court verdict found OJ
not guilty, many people accepted that verdict as a determinant of
future public policy toward OJ, but would not accept it as any kind
of proof because they were not persuaded.
>> No, I have not accepted the linguistic turn, and have clearly
>> disagreed with some of its implications.
>No, not clear to me at all - perhaps my fault. You don't seem to have
>any position that I can make out, but you seem to offer a semantic
>argument against there being knowledge and truth, and if so, my
>impression is that this is usually seen as part of the "Linguistic
>Turn."
No, I have not argued against there being knowledge and truth.
I have argued against the traditional accounts of what constitutes
truth and knowledge.
--------
>>>Again, the term correspondence theory of truth can be used to define
>>>truth or it can refer to the ways in which we verify that statements
>>>correspond to the world.
>> But it cannot do either unless you have first developed a notion of
>> correspondence that is independent of your concept of truth.
>This seems circular. If I define truth as the relation of statements and
>the world where the statement corresponds to that reality in some sense,
>then where's the problem?
It is so vague as to not be definitive, and therefore cannot be
a definition.
>You seem to say that to define truth presumes the existence of a
>transcendental Truth, where in fact truth is only a label we invent to
>point to an attribute of the statement of the relationship between
>specific statements and their referents.
I have no problem with truth as a relation between statements and
their referents. But I cannot find that in the correspondence
theory.
There is a substantial literature on truth, that attempts to define
it as correspondence, and which presupposes that we have already
settled questions about reference. And then there is another
substantial literature on reference, that attempts to define
reference in terms of an already presumed understanding of truth.
I am simply pointing out that the emperor has no clothes. The whole
thing is completely circular, and actually tells us nothing about
either truth or reference.
Now take a scientific theory. But don't take it as just a
self-contained set of propositions. Instead, look at it in the
context of science. That context includes the laboratory training
that students of science take, and where they learn the practices
of the particular science. I think you will see that a scientific
theory, looked at in this manner, is actually concerned with defining
terms and establishing reference for those terms. If you look at
special relativity, the purpose of the thought experiments that
Einstein gave was to help establish reference, as it was to be
used under SR. Looked at that way, you will see that the role of
a scientific theory is to setup the reference, such that it will
then become possible to have a truth relation between statements
and their referents. The theory is prior to being able to make
the statements for which we want there to be an attribute of truth.
> You have to offer an
>explanation why any claim of such a correspondence presumes a
>transcendental notion of truth, if that indeed is what you are
>claiming.
It requires a transcendental notion of truth, only when it
depends on a transcendental notion of correspondence. And the
literature on correspondence theory mostly seems to be dependent
on a transcendental notion of correspondence.
> Surely you can readily provide such an argument. By
>"transcendental" do you mean detachable from statements? If so, why do
>you say that?
You introduced the word "transcendental" to the discussion.
Don't ask me what you mean - I can only hope that I got it right
in my response.
-----
>You may misunderstand me. I said that "often" an outside standard is
>used. If I say the pencil is eight inches long, the outside standard
>would be a ruler. But the use of this ruler is to _verify_ the truth of
>the statement, it is not the meaning of "true statement".
Suppose I use a ruler to determine that the width of my window
is 30 inches. I then order window shades. I sure hope that the
store will use a ruler to determine the meaning of "30 inches".
I would not want them to just make wild guesses at how wide the
shades should be.
Sure, the ruler does not define "true", but it does define reference
(or this particular case of reference). My objection to the
correspondence theory is that you cannot define truth in terms of
reference, if reference is itself undefined. And once reference
is defined, that implicitly defines truth without a separate theory
or definition of truth being required.
>OK, maybe here you try:
>> You measure the height of your desk to be 30 inches. Did you already
>> know that it was 30 inches, and that you can now say that the
>> measurement is true because it corresponds to the way the world is?
>> Or did you have to measure it first, to determine that it is 30
>> inches, and from that you determined something about the way the world
>> is?
>When I measure my desk's height, I find that my desk's height corresponds
>to about 30 units on my measuring stick, and a statement to that effect
>has been verified.
Okay. But here you are establishing correspondence with a social
convention (the use of a measuring stick). What does that have to
do with correspondence with reality?
My view is that we use correspondence with such social conventions
as a way of establishing what we mean by reality.
The picture painted by philosophy is that the world is full of
propositions, and what we need to do is have ways of determining
whether those propositions are true. My alternative view is that,
absent humans, the world would be devoid of propositions. Humans
have to invent ways of producing propositions that describe the
world. To do that, they have to invent terminology and conditions
of reference for that terminology. And, in so inventing, they
implicitly provide criteria for truth of those propositions which
their inventions have made possible.
>Or are you saying that truth reduces to observation?
No. The use of "observation" is one of my objections to traditional
empiricism. If the world is devoid of propositions, until humans
invent ways of forming propositions, then it follows that observation
is impossible until after such invention.
The conventional wisdom sees science and knowledge as having to do
with determining whether propositions are true. I see science and
knowledge as having to do with finding ways of forming propositions,
which could not even have existed without the kind of activity that
humans engage in.
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| Topic: |
Universality as warrant for relative truth value |
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| Message: |
Author |
Date |
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*Message 1* |
Neil W Rickert |
Tue, 15 Jul 2008, 10:24 am |
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